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I. INTRODUCTION
The joint adventure' is a jural relationship that emerged from the
confines of partnership law in the last decade of the nineteenth century.z
It was liberated from its earlier treatment as a special form of partner-
ship by the American courts by being recognized as a separate type of
business association.' Notwithstanding this emergence, there is still great
controversy as to the proper classification of the relationship,4 and the
myriad of divergent attempts to define and identify the joint venture
attest to its questionable posture in our legal environment.
The problem is not simply one of semantic cataloguing, however.
Whether it is agreed that the joint adventure is a form of partnership or
1. The terms "joint adventure" and "joint venture" are synonomous and will be used
interchangeably. See Myers v. Lillard, 215 Ark. 355, 220 S.W.2d 608 (1948).
2. In Ross v. Willett, 58 N.Y. 694, 27 N.Y. Supp. 785 (1894), the joint adventure was
accorded the connotation of a distinct legal relationship. See also Buckmaster v. Grundy,
8 Ill. 626 (1846) ; Claffin v. Godfrey, 38 Mass. 1 (1838).
3. "The concept of joint adventure as a legal relationship or association sui generis
is purely of American origin dating from about 1890." State ex rel. Crane Co. v. Stokke,
65 S.D. 207, 220, 272 N.W. 811, 817 (1937). The first cases referring to the joint adventure
by name were Hourquiebie v. Girard, 12 Fed. Cas. 593 (No. 6732) (C.C.D. Pa. 1808),
and Lyles v. Styles, 15 Fed. Cas. 1143 (No. 8625) (C.C.D. Pa. 1808).
4. See Nichols, Joint Ventures, 36 VA. L. REV. 425 (1950), wherein the author attempts
to prove that there are no realistic differences between the partnership and the joint
adventure. Contrast this with Jaeger, Partnership or Joint Venture?, 37 NOTRE DAME LAW.
138 (1961), in which the author states that it can no longer be successfully argued that
the joint venture is merely a form of partnership. See also, Mechem, The Law of Joint
Adventures, 15 MINN. L. REV. 644, 657 (1931).
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categorically separate,5 there still must be a way to formulate a set of
component elements by which the existence of the relationship, no matter
what its characterization, can be more easily determined under varied
factual circumstances. Courts generally concede that mutual control and
joint proprietorship over the subject matter, sharing of profits, contribu-
tion of money or services, and a contract, express or implied, establishing
the relationship are indicative of the joint venture.6 They are in marked
disagreement, however, whether sharing of losses, or at least an agreement
to share losses, is a necessary prerequisite to the existence of the rela-
tionship.
7
Strangely enough, the emphasis of all textual writers has been
centered on the broad characterization problem of the joint adventure,
and the inner difficulties engendered by the loss-sharing dilemma have
been relegated to a terse statement to the effect that "the courts are split
on this point." It is the opinion of this writer that a detailed analysis of
the loss-sharing problem, of which there has been a distinct paucity, is
both necessary and timely.8
This paper is divided into three sections: the first is a familiarization
of the reader with the historical, definitional and physical characteristics
of the joint adventure; the second is a detailed investigation into the
varied treatment of sharing of losses by those jurisdictions rendering
applicable decisions; and the third is an analysis and critique of the
Florida cases.
5. In most instances, the two relationships may be referred to interchangeably since
the governing legal principles are, more often than not, identical. In other words, wherever
this substitution of terms appears, it should be assumed that the factual situation referred
to was parallel with that of a partnership. For all practical purposes, the consequences of
being held to one or the other are almost, if not quite, identical. Some distinctions have
been made however, such as Jaeger, note 4 supra at 150; 33 HARV. L. REv. 852 (1920). In
certain instances these distinctions become quite important. See 18 FORDHAM L. REV. 114,
126 (1949), wherein it is pointed out that the parties may not wish to merge their business
affairs any more than is necessary for the completion of the joint project. They may
not wish to be burdened by the permanency or legal formality of a partnership. In addition,
there may be no desire to be mutually bound beyond the successful completion of the
transaction in question.
6. See 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 318A (3d ed. 1959).
7. See section III of this article's text infra.
8. Since a favorable determination of the issue of sharing of losses may well affect
the designation of a given factual pattern before the court as joint venture or otherwise,
detailed investigation is indeed a necessity. As to timeliness, see Taubman, What Constitutes
a Joint Venture, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 640, 650 (1956), wherein he states:
The essence of joint venture is intent to associate for the time being, either by
way of a single or determinable series of transactions or for a limited tme.
Modern commercial society increases the possibilities and opportunities for short-
term association for profit. Concomitantly, speculation, the taking of risks for
gain, increases. Rapid technological change forces certain branches of industry
to seek a spreading of risk of loss. Interdependence, acceleration of transportation,
and easier communication contribute to making short-term joint economic activity
desirable, if not necessary. ...
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II. THE CONTOURS OF THE VENTURE
A. History
The joint adventure as a form of business association is steeped in
antiquity, and was originally used as a commercial and maritime device
to support large trading enterprises by the merchants and businessmen
of ancient Egypt, Babylonia, Phoenicia and Syria.' Various forms of
associations, characteristically similar to both partnerships and joint
ventures, developed to satisfy the needs for greater capital manifested by
ancient society.'" Thus, when the Roman Empire was at its zenith,
partnerships were utilized when the transaction of business required
comparatively minimal amounts of capital, while a joint venture was
used when a greater concentration of wealth was necessary." The early
venture not only afforded the opportunity to raise large aggregates of
capital, but also enabled the participating individuals to spread their
risks accordingly.
With the expansion of commerce in England, the advantages of
capital concentration and risk diffusion caused the joint venture to
become popular. However, the legal concept of the relationship, rather
than the business concept, was unsuccessful in freeing itself from the
vise-like grip of general partnership law due to the lack of differentiation
by the English common law between the two types of business associa-
tions. 2 This merging of the relationships was a precursor of the diffi-
culties that have been encountered by contemporary tribunals in categori-
zation problems. Therefore, it was not until the relationship was used
in America" that its legal nature reached a stage of development equal
to that of its business character.
Joint adventures are of modern origin, creatures of American
courts, not recognized at early common law apart from partner-
ships, but now considered to be a status created by persons
combining their properties or services in the conduct of an enter-
prise without forming a formal partnership.' 4
B. Definitional Doldrums
Before attempting to define the joint adventure, it is necessary to
lay a foundation by recognizing that it is a voluntary relationship, the
9. See BARNES, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 14 (1937); BEARD, HISTORY
OF T1E BUSINESS MAN 12-29 (1938); CHiLDE, )E LIFE OP TnE ANCIENT EAST (1929);
KNIGHT, ECONOmiC HISTORY OF EUROPE 19" (1928).
10. See GILBART, LECTURES ON ANCIENT COMMERCE 160 (1847); REES, SUMMARY OF
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 240 (1933).
11. See ASiLEY, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH ECONOMIC HISTORY AND THEORY 414 (1920);
GRAS, BUSINESS AND CAPITALISM 41, 42 (1939).
12. See LINDLEY, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 171 (10th ed. 1935); POLLOCK,
DIGEST OP THE LAW OP PARTNERSHIP 6 (11th ed. 1920).
13. The joint venture came to the United States with the industrial revolution and the
heightened commerce of England. Despite very-modest beginnings, its specialized attributes
in applicable situations made its growth inevitable. See note 5 supra.
14. Edlebeck v. Hooten, 121 N.W.2d 240,.241 (Wis. 1963).
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origin of which is wholly ex contractu.8 To create it, an agreement
between the parties is essential and whether or not it exists depends
entirely upon their intention, either express or implied. 6 As a general
rule, joint adventures are thought of in relation to a single undertaking,"
although the specific venture need not be one susceptible of immediate
accomplishment. It is in the nature of a partnership limited to a particu-
lar venture, not general in operation or duration. However, no completely
satisfactory definition has yet been formulated, since the joint adventure
"is at best a nebulous concept whose boundaries are not precisely
drawn."' In most cases the courts have been content merely to determine
whether the proven or conceded facts in the particular case constituted
a joint venture, "depending on the terms of the agreement, the acts of
the parties, the nature of the undertaking and other facts."' 9 Never-
theless, definitional attempts are numerous and their lack of uniformity
attests to the elusive nature of the relationship.
Although the lack of an all-inclusive definition of the term "joint
adventure" is recognized, it is often described as "an association of two
or more persons to carry out a single business enterprise for profit, for
which purpose they combine their property, money, effects, skill and
knowledge."20 Equally numerous are statements to the effect that it is a
special combination of two or more persons, where profit is jointly
sought in a specific venture which lacks any partnership or corporate
designation.2' This latter definition recognizes the gradual metamorphosis
of the joint adventure from an early assimilation into partnerships
evolving to a non-identical relationship with an accepted legal per-
sonality. Though separate concepts, the close partnership ties return
whenever one focuses on the applicable law governing a typical venture
problem.
15. Thus, it is not a status created or imposed by law. See Hyman v. Regenstein,
258 F.2d 502, 503 (5th Cir. 1958); Coral Gables Sec. Corp. v. Miami Corp., 123 Fla. 172,
166 So. 555 (1936); Fitzhugh v. Thode, 221 Iowa 533, 265 N.W. 893 (1936); Whan v.
Smith, 130 Kan. 9, 285 Pac. 589 (1930); Carboneau v. Peterson, 1 Wash. 2d 347, 95 P.2d
1043 (1939).
16. This follows from the fact that since the sine qua non of the relationship of joint
adventure is a contract, the determinative intentions and understandings of the parties
must be disclosed therein. See Hyman v. Regenstein, supra note 15; Summers v. Hoffman,
341 Mich. 686, 69 N.W.2d 198 (1955) ; Lampe v. Tyrell, 200 Wash. 589, 94 P.2d 193 (1939);
2 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS chs. 3-5 (3d ed. 1959).
17. Perhaps the most frequently asserted distinction between the partnership and the
joint adventure is the fact that the former "is usually created to carry on a specific type
of business for profit over a long period of time, while a joint venture is usually formed
for the purpose of a single business transaction." Fishback v. United States, 215 F. Supp.
621, 625 (S.D.S.D. 1963). See also Tidewater Constr. Co. v. Monroe County, 107 Fla.
648, 146 So. 209 (1933); McCann v. Todd, 203 La. 631, 14 So.2d 469 (1943).
18. Backus Plywood Corp. v. Commercial Decal, Inc., 208 F. Supp. 687, 690 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
19. Sample v. Romine, 193 Miss. 706, 726, 8 So.2d 257, 260 (1942).
20. People v. Miller, 192 Cal. App. 2d 871, 13 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1961) ; Proctor v. Hearne,
100 Fla. 1180, 1181, 131 So. 173, 176 (1930) ; Pigg v. Bridges, 352 S.W.2d 28, 33 (Mo. 1961).
21. People v. Miller, supra not% 20; Proctor v. Hearne, supra note 20; Hathaway v.
Porter Royalty Pool, 296 Mich. 90, 295 N.W. 571 (1941).
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It is sometimes difficult, and often unnecessary, to distinguish
in particular cases between joint adventures and partnerships,
since the relations of the parties to a joint adventure and the
nature of the association are so similar and closely akin to a
partnership that it is commonly held that their rights, duties,
and liabilities are to be tested by rules which are closely anal-
ogous to, and generally substantially the same as, those which
govern partnerships. . . .The outstanding difference between
a joint adventure and a partnership is that the former relates
to a single transaction, although it may comprehend a business
to be continued over several years, while the latter relates to a
general and continuing business of a particular kind, although
there may be a partnership for a single transaction....
Other definitional variations might be given, but their only function
would be to indicate the essential characteristics various jurisdictions at-
tribute to the relationship. Suffice it to say that even though the term joint
adventure connotes a semantic blur, defining it is still "easier than
identifying it, for each case depends upon its own facts. '23
C. Physical Composition-The Identity Problem
There is no uniformity of opinion or determinative precedent as to
the explicit composition of a joint adventure. The ultimate determi-
nation of whether certain individuals are engaged in the relationship
depends upon their intention,24 the best evidence of which is the con-
tractual agreement between the parties and the construction they have
given it by words or conduct. The crucial point then, is the question
of what factors the various jurisdictions have deemed significant in
evidencing the requisite intent.
Besides the universally accepted precept that there be a contractual
basis25 for the joint adventure, certain additional elements are generally
agreed upon as being essential to its existence:
(1) a single or ad hoc business transaction rather than a general
and continuous enterprise; 
26
(2) a right of mutual control or voice in the management of the
enterprise and its attendant affairs; 27
22. Kislak v. Kreedian, 95 So.2d 510, 514 (Fla. 1957).
23. Backus Plywood Corp. v. Commercial Decal, Inc., 208 F. Supp. 687, 690 ($.D.N.Y.
1962).
24. Whether the parties to a particular contract have thereby created, as between
themselves, the relation of joint adventurers, or some other relation, depends upon
their actual intention, which is to be determined in accordance with the ordinary
rules governing the interpretation and construction of contracts. Bryce v. Bull,
106 Fla. 336, 343, 143 So. 409, 411 (1932).
25. See note 15 supra.
26. Jaeger, Partnership or Joint Venture?, 37 NOTRE DAME LAW. 138, 151, 152 n.76,
81 (1961); see note 17 supra. 1
27. Balestrieri & Co. v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1959) ; Peoples v. Seamon,
1963]
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(3) a joint contribution by the parties and a community of interest
in these assets of the common undertaking; 28
(4i) an expectation of making a profit from the venture; 2 and
(5) a joint right of participation in any profits derived. °
Several of these elements, perhaps all, will frequently appear in the
joint adventure, although it cannot be affirmatively stated that one of
them, standing alone, will be sufficient to create the relationship.
The chameleon-like character of the venture is embodied in the wide
diversity of opinion concerning the necessity of sharing of losses between
the co-adventurers as an incident to the relationship.8 Examination of
the cases will reveal the utter lack of any uniform treatment of this
element and a marked divergence in the views propounded by the juris-
dictions examined. If it is accepted that the problem of identifying the
venture surpasses that of its definition, then it can be said that the loss-
sharing controversy occupies an even higher rung on this ladder of diffi-
culties inherent in the relationship of joint adventure.
III. EXPLORING THE AREA OF LosS-SHARING
The central theme of sharing of losses has been interpreted by the
courts into a multitude of conflicting viewpoints. The jurisdictions align
themselves, as to whether loss-sharing by the parties is essential to the
existence of a joint adventure, in the following manner:
A. Losses must be shared for a joint adventure to exist.
1. There must be an agreement, express or implied, to share in
the losses incurred by the enterprise. 2
249 Ala. 284, 31 So.2d 88 (1947); Livingston v. Twyman, 43 So.2d 354 (Fla. 1950); Boyd
v. Hunter, 104 Fla. 561, 140 So. 666 (1932); Klaber v. Klaber, 131 So.2d 98 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1961).
28. Yokom v. Rodriguez, 41 So.2d 446 (Fla. 1949); Coral Gables Sec. Corp. v. Miami
Corp., 123 Fla. 172, 166 So. 555 (1936); O'Neil v. Stoll, 218 Iowa 908, 255 N.W. 692
(1934); Hasday v. Barocas, 10 Misc. 2d 22, 115 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1952). See Carboneau v.
Peterson, 1 Wash. 2d 347, 375, 95 P.2d 1043, 1055 (1939).
29. This is the so-called element of "adventure," which differentiates the joint adventure
from the joint enterprise. In the latter relationship, no anticipation of making a profit is
deemed essential and it encompasses a much broader area of joint undertakings. See LaMar
v. Lechlder, 135 Fla. 703, 185 So. 833 (1939); Sappenfield v. Mead, 338 Ill. App. 236,
87 N.E.2d 220 (1949); 2 WUmrsToN, CoNTRACTs § 318B (3d ed. 1959). Contra, West v.
Soto, 85 Ariz. 255, 336 P.2d 153 (1959).
30. It appears that the absence of profit-sharing is indicative of a relationship lacking a
community of interest, such as that of employer-employee. See Pollard v. Browder, 126
So.2d 310 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961); Tusant v. Weitz, 195 Iowa 1386, 191 N.W. 884 (1923).
See also Taylor v. Brindley, 164 F.2d 235 (10th Cir. 1947).
31. See section III of this article's text infra, and the various viewpoints examined therein.
32. Cross v. Pasley, 270 F.2d 88 (8th Cir. 1959) (Missouri law); Fishback v. United
States, 215 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.S.D. 1963); Backus Plywood Corp. v. Commercial Decal, Inc.,
208 F. Supp. 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Flanders v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 935 (N.D. Cal.
1959); Kirkpatrick v. Smith, 113 Cal. App. 2d 409, 248 P.2d 534 (1952); Carmer v. J. Leo
[VOL. XVIII
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2. If one party furnishes the capital of the enterprise and the
other his services, an agreement to share losses is not neces-
sary since they will be deemed shared by the very nature of
the undertaking."s
B. Sharing of losses is not a necessary prerequisite.
1. Sharing of losses is not an incident of, and is not indispens-
able to, the existence of a joint adventure.84
2. A venture relationship may exist wherein there is an express
agreement not to share losses. 5
It must be emphasized that, in reality, no clear-cut alignment is
present, since many jurisdictions have rendered decisions espousing dif-
ferent theories of loss-sharing without any attempt to reconcile the views.
Thus, there have been no reversals on the loss-sharing issue primarily
because there is so much confusion and incongruity that the courts cannot
crystalize a basis for their decisions. It is not uncommon in synthesizing
the cases to discover that two or more are in direct conflict.8 Indeed, this
writer has found no decision in which the court examined the multitude
of loss-sharing theories and attempted to catalogue them for the purpose
of providing some semblance of order. The basic uncertainty and indeci-
sion of the courts on the issue of sharing of losses may well stem from
the failure to relegate properly the various factual situations into their
appropriate categories.
Johnson, Inc., 150 A.2d 621 (Del. 1959); Tidewater Constr. Co. v. Monroe County, 107
Fla. 648, 146 So. 209 (1933); Bryce v. Bull, 106 Fla. 336, 143 So. 409 (1932); Florence v.
Fox, 193 Iowa 1174, 188 N.W. 966 (1922); Richards v. Grinnell, 63 Iowa 44, 18 N.W. 668
(1884); Hughes v. Bond, 154 So.2d 281 (Miss. 1963); Fullerton v. Kaune, 72 N.M. 201,
382 P.2d 529 (1963); Mariani v. Summers, 52 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Marston v.
Gould, 69 N.Y. 220 (1877); Pfleider v. Smith, 370 P.2d 17 (Okla. 1962); Norman v.
B.V. Christie & Co., 363 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
33. Heran v. Hall, 40 Ky. (1 B. Mon.) 159 (1840); Kovacik v. Reed, 49 Cal. App. 2d
166, 315 P.2d 314 (1957); Martter v. Byers, 75 Cal. App. 2d 375, 171 P.2d 101 (1946);
Shoemake v. Davis, 146 Kan. 909, 73 P.2d 1043 (1937); Russell v. Theilen, 82 So.2d 143
(Fla. 1955); Summers v. Hoffman, 341 Mich. 686, 69 N.W.2d 198 (1955); Keiswetter v.
Rubenstein, 235 Mich. 36, 209 N.W. 154 (1926); Sample v. Romine, 193 Miss. 706, 8 So.2d
257 (1942) ; Masterson v. Allen, 69 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) ; In re Starer's Estate,
20 Wis. 2d 268, 121 N.W.2d 872 (1963).
34. Eagle Star Ins. Co. v. Bean, 134 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1943) (Washington law);
Reid v. Shaffer, 249 Fed. 553 (6th Cir. 1918); Tate v. Knox, 131 F. Supp. 514 (D. Minn.
1955); Pigg v. Bridges, 352 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. 1961); Warwick v. Stockton, 55 N.J. Eq.
61, 36 Atl. 488 (1897); Usdan v. Rosenblatt, 93 N.Y.S.2d 862 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Devereaux
v. Cockerline, 179 Ore. 229, 170 P.2d 727 (1946); Whetstone v. Purdue, 107 Ore. 86,
213 Pac. 1014 (1923); Smith v. Grenadier, 203 Va. 740, 127 S.E.2d 107 (1962).
35. First Mechanics Bank v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 275 (3d Cir. 1937); Frazell v.
United States, 213 F. Supp. 457 (W.D. La. 1963); Crowson v. Cody, 209 Ala. 674, 96 So.
875 (1923) ; James v. Herbert, 149 Cal. App. 2d 741, 309 P.2d 91 (1957) ; Orvis v. Curtiss,
157 N.Y. 657, 52 N.E. 690 (1899); Salter v. Havivi, 215 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Sup. Ct. 1961);
AMil Factors Corp. v. Margolies, 210 App. Div. 739, 206 N.Y. Supp. 434 (1924); Las Vegas
Mach. & Engine Works v. Roemisch, 67 Nev. 1, 213 P.2d 319 (1950).
36. By comparing notes 32-36, note the discrepancies and overlapping in California,
Florida, Missouri, New York and Texas.
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A. Losses Must Be Shared
1. LOOK TO THE AGREEMENT
a. Express Agreement to Share Losses
Many early decisions made the blanket declaration that there had
to be an express agreement to share in both profits and losses in order
for a relationship to be considered a joint adventure.87 This approach
apparently was a carryover from the accepted principle that a contractual
agreement was necessary to establish the venture relationship. Indeed,
some courts still follow this rigid approach, as evidenced by the recent
case of Fullerton v. Kaune,8 wherein the court stated:
A joint adventure is formed when, by agreement between the
parties to the joint adventure, the parties combine their money,
property or time in the conduct of some particular business
deal, agreeing to share jointly in the profits and losses of the
venture .... 89
b. Implied Loss-Sharing Provision
Other decisions required that an agreement, express or implied, to
share in the profits and losses of the venture must always be present.4
Thus, some early decisions held that should a provision for sharing of
losses be omitted in the purported venture agreement, the law would
supply an implied provision to the effect that the parties must share
losses.4 However, it is necessary to point out that the question of loss-
sharing has been troubling the courts since the very emergence of the joint
adventure concept. While some early cases required a loss-sharing agree-
ment, others laid down broad principles to the effect that parties could
be held to be co-adventurers although some were not to become liable
for any share of the losses if the business proved unsuccessful.
For example, in Warwick v. Stockton,42 the plaintiff sold exclusive
rights to sell and manufacture certain inventions to the defendant, who
was to provide all the necessary capital for the enterprise and pay the
plaintiff half the profits. Upon the plaintiff's suit for an accounting based
on a theory of partnership, the court held the relationship to be one of
joint adventure, wherein a receiver would not be appointed in the absence
of fraud or mismanagement endangering the joint assets.
[N]or is there anything in the agreement to indicate the . . .
37. See Florence v. Fox, 193 Iowa 1174, 188 N.W. 966 (1922).
38. 72 N.M. 201, 382 P.2d 529 (1963).
39. 382 P.2d 529, 532 (N.M. 1963).
40. Richards v. Grinnell, 63 Iowa 44, 18 N.W. 668 (1884); Marston v. Gould, 69
N.Y. 220 (1877).
41. For representative language, see Kirkpatrick v. Smith, 113 Cal. App. 2d 409, 248
P.2d 534 (1952); Mariani v. Summers, 52 N.Y.S.2d 750, 754 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
42. 55 N.J. Eq. 61, 36 Ati. 488 (1897).
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[plaintiff ] was to become liable for any share of the losses if the
business was unsuccessful .... [T]he relations were not those
of partners, but of a mere common interest in a joint adventure
in which one party took all the risk of loss, and the other party
had a share of the profits, if any.48
The tenor of these early decisions was that a partnership required sharing
of losses, while a joint adventure could exist without it. In those jurisdic-
tions subscribing to this view, the initial cases are still good law and
exemplify one of the views which has prevailed since its rendition. The
later decisions, which adhere to this liberal non-requisite loss-sharing
view, will be examined in a subsequent section."
Since, in many instances, the agreement that purported to form the
basis of a joint adventure had no express provision for sharing of losses,
those jurisdictions that established loss-sharing as a prerequisite to the
existence of the relationship were apparently barred from sustaining an
assertion of joint adventure. However, the concept of an implied or
inferred agreement to share losses, wherein the venture relationship could
be saved, developed early in the law and is prevalent today. As early as
1884, it was held that:
it is not necessary, in order to constitute a partnership, that
there be an express agreement that each party shall bear a share
of any losses which may occur in the business. This may be in-
ferred from the other provisions of the contract, and the nature
of the business, and the relation of parties to the business to be
transacted.4"
It is interesting to note the discrepancies between this case, and the early
cases indicating that loss-sharing was not indispensable to the existence
of the venture relationship. In the latter, a partnership was distinguished
from a joint adventure by virtue of whether losses were shared. In this
decision, the word partnership is used synonymously with venture
terminology, indicating that both relationships require some type of agree-
ment to share losses. Inconsistencies such as these make the area of joint
adventures such a perplexing one that rather than diminishing the diffi-
culties, they are compounded as more and more decisions are rendered.
Those jurisdictions which advocate the theory of an implied loss-
sharing provision recognize its existence whenever the venture agreement
is silent in that respect. They reason that since the joint adventure is a
matter of contract, with attendant rights and duties created thereunder,
every co-adventurer is bound by his relation to his associates to share
43. Id. at 65, 36 Atl. at 489-90. See also, Reid v. Shaffer, 249 Fed. 553 (6th Cir. 1918),
wherein the parties were held to be joint adventurers rather than partners because there
was no sharing of losses between them.
44. See "Loss-Sharing Not Required," section III B(1) infra.
45. Richards v. Grinnell, 63 Iowa 44, 51, 18 N.W 668, 671 (1884).
19631
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with them the losses sustained. The usual presumption is that the parties
intended to share losses in the same proportion as they share the profits.4"
However, in the recent decision of Hughes v. Bond,47 a different inter-
pretation was given to the sharing ratio.
In Hughes, three individuals entered into an agreement that did not
contain a loss-sharing provision, due to the fact that they did not contem-
plate the occurrence of any losses. Nevertheless, the court upheld the
relationship as a joint adventure, and ruled that the net losses should be
prorated among the parties. Thus, each co-adventurer had to contribute
one-third of the losses, notwithstanding their profit-sharing arrangement
or whether one of them did more work than the others. In addition to this
novel loss-sharing ratio, Hughes illustrates how a venture problem is
treated if the parties "contemplate no losses."
In Fishback v. United States,48 another recent decision, a taxpayer
argued that he was entitled to capital gains treatment on a sale of prop-
erty. If the court deemed the vendee to be a joint adventure, the character
of the property as a capital asset would have been lost.49 The taxpayer
asserted that no venture existed due to the lack of an agreement to share
losses. However, the court held the relationship to be a joint venture even
though there was no express agreement to share losses by finding that the
parties' failure to contemplate losses resulted in a loss provision being
implied from the general risk-sharing character of the relationship.
2. LOSS-SHARING IRRESPECTIVE OF THE AGREEMENT
a. Contributions of Money and Services
Although an express or implied agreement to share losses is usually
present, a factual pattern frequently occurs wherein one party furnishes
services and the other provides the necessary capital for the enterprise.
Unlike the other facets of loss-sharing, this situation has been accorded
a degree of uniformity in that when it arises, a loss-sharing agreement is
usually not held necessary to the existence of the venture relationship. 0
Even though a sharing of the losses is deemed essential, the term " 'loss'
46. Kirkpatrick v. Smith, 113 Cal. App. 2d 409, 248 P.2d 534 (1952) ; Martter v. Byers,
75 Cal. App. 2d 375, 171 P.2d 101 (1946); Mariani v. Summers, 52 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct.
1944).
47. 154 So.2d 281 (Miss. 1963).
48. 215 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.S.D. 1963).
49. "[S]o long as the property in question was held solely by taxpayer, it had the
character of a capital asset, but that when the contract was entered into for the 'develop-
ment' of the area . . . a joint venture was created, and the property was thereafter held
primarily for sale in the ordinary course of business." Id. at 625.
50. The only decision involving contributions of money and services wherein resort
was still made to the concept of an implied agreement to share losses, rather than loss-sharing
irrespective of a venture agreement, is In re Starer's Estate, 20 Wis. 2d 268, 121 N.W.2d
872 (1963). Considering how recent the case is, a trend indicating a return to the agreement
concept may be forming, or this may be just an isolated instance of rebellion from the
theory of non-monetary loss.
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does not necessarily mean actual 'monetary loss.' "' Thus, where the
nature of the undertaking is such that one party furnishes money and the
other time, labor and knowledge, "an agreement to share the profits may
stamp it as a joint adventure, although nothing is said about sharing the
losses,'" since, in the event of a loss, one party "may lose his money and
the other his work on the failure of the venture.""8 Since the courts reason
that a loss-sharing agreement is actually involved in this type of enter-
prise, 4 the fact that there is no specific agreement to bear a proportion
of the losses does not negative the existence of the relation.5
An issue that frequently arises in these cases of service and money
contributions is whether the party contributing his skills is liable to his
associates if financial losses are sustained in the venture. Normally, he
is not liable since each person has sustained a corresponding loss--i.e.,
labor on the one hand, and money on the other.56 However, difficulties
frequently arise from the intricate interpretations concerning whether
the adventurer contributing services owns any interest in the property
contributed by the non-service party, and could thus be held liable for its
replacement in the event of the enterprise suffering losses.57 An example
is Masterson v. Allen,5" wherein the plaintiff furnished money for the
enterprise and the defendant contributed services. Losses resulted, and
the plaintiff sought contribution from the defendant for the debts of the
partnership.59 The court held that the partnership property was exclu-
sively made up of the use of the plaintiff's money and the defendant's
services; therefore, the defendant could not be held for the replacement
of the former.
In partnership, where work is contributed on one side and
money on the other, the partner from whom the money comes
may contribute only the use of the money or the property of it.
If he contributes the use of it, and still keeps his property in the
principal, so that the joint stock is to be considered as made up
of the labor of one partner and the use of the other's money, it
is plain that, supposing the principal to be safe, it belongs to
him, and that, supposing it to be lost, he alone bears the loss.
The other partner who contributes work, since as the case is
put, he had no claim to the principal money or any part of it,
51. Summers v. Hoffman, 341 Mich. 686, 693, 69 N.W.2d 198, 201 (1955).
52. Sample v. Romine, 193 Miss. 706, 727, 8 So.2d 257, 261 (1942).
53. Shoemake v. Davis, 146 Kan. 909, 912, 73 P.2d 1043 (1937).
54. Boxwell v. Champagne, 299 Miss. 355, 91 So.2d 256 (1956).
55. Keiswetter v. Rubenstein, 235 Mich. 36, 209 N.W. 154 (1926).
56. Heran v. Hall, 40 Ky. (I B Mon.) 159 (1840).
57. The converse does not appear to be true, however, since profitable operations usually
,result in the non-service party's getting all his money back before any profits are divided,
instead of only receiving a share of the capital he furnished.
58. Masterson v. Allen, 69 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
59. As previously pointed out, the partnership and venture relationships may be
interpreted synonymously under applicable factual circumstances. See note 22 supra and
accompanying text.
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cannot be obliged to make good any part of the loss, or to bear
any share of it .... '0
Thus, it is obvious that if the non-service party contributes the "prop-
erty" of his funds, rather than the "use," the joint stock of the venture is
made up of both money and labor, upon which each of the parties have
a common claim."' Therefore, if the property is lost, the party contribut-
ing services can be held for a share of the loss since he owned an indi-
vidual interest in the property. Fortunately, the courts usually accept a
money-labor undertaking as satisfying the loss-sharing requirement on
its face, rather than delving into the semantic complexities detailed
above.
b. Loan Situations
Similar problems arise whenever one party advances money to an
enterprise in return for a share in the profits at a higher percentage than
the legal interest rate. 2 The issue is whether the undertaking is a joint
adventure or a loan tainted with usury. If it is the latter, there can be no
recovery of the principal sum advanced or the expected share in profits.
The crux of the problem revolves around the fact that the courts are
divided in these cases where the party furnishing capital is guaranteed
"repayment regardless of loss." It appears that those courts which require
sharing of losses also advocate the necessity of the principal sum being
subjected to the hazards of loss in the venture. 8 They reason that since
the money advanced is returnable in any event, it is not subject to loss
and any assertion of joint adventure or partnership must fail. 4 In reach-
ing this result, the courts often conclude that the transaction was, in fact,
a loan in the form of a venture agreement, executed by way of shift or
contrivance to conceal usury. 5
The position of those courts which do not recognize sharing of losses
60. Masterson v. Allen, 69 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934). (Emphasis added.) It
should be noted how unworkable the court's approach was, in that the result in each
case would vary according to whether the non-service party contributed the property, or
use of his money. However, no standards for such a determination were presented, nor
did the court indicate that it recognized the characterization difficulties inherent in their
interpretation of the problem.
61. Ibid.
62. The usual situation is that in which one individual makes advancements under an
agreement to share in earnings of, or income from, the enterprise, in lieu of, or in addition
to, interest. As a practical matter, the rate of return will exceed the maximum specified in
the jurisdiction's usury statute.
63. Thus, in these jurisdictions if repayment is guaranteed, the principal sum is not
in danger and the transaction will be characterized as a loan, rather than a joint adventure.
In re Starer's Estate, 20 Wis. 2d 268, 121 N.W.2d 872 (1963). See Griffin v. Kelly, 92
So.2d 515 (Fla. 1957); Cooper v. Rothman, 63 Fla. 394, 57 So. 985 (1912); Dublin v.
Veal, 341 S.W.2d 776 (Ky. 1960) (creditor's entire profit or return must be put in jeopardy);
Boone v. Andrews, 30 Ohio C.C. 166 (1907).
64. See Dubos v. Jones, 34 Fla. 539, 16 So. 392 (1894).
65. Crowson v. Cody, 209 Ala. 674, 96 So. 875 (1923); Diversified Enterprises, Inc.
v. West, 141 So.2d 27 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
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as an essential element of a joint adventure, in connection with loans, is
illustrated by the landmark case of Orvis v. Curtiss.66 In that decision,
the parties jointly agreed to buy stock and opened a joint account for that
purpose. The plaintiff agreed to furnish the necessary money, and net
profits were to be divided equally. In addition, the defendant guaranteed
that the plaintiff would not lose, and assured him of a profit of not less
than 5,000 dollars. A large loss resulted from the undertaking, which the
defendant paid. Subsequently, the plaintiff sued for his 5,000 dollars and
the defendant asserted that the transaction was a usurious loan. The
court held for the plaintiff, establishing their relationship as co-adven-
turers or co-partners.
It is plain that the defendant's purpose was not to borrow
money, but to deal in stocks .... The plaintiff's purpose was to
buy stocks at the defendant's risk . . . . He took care also to
make such an agreement with the defendant as would exempt
him from all possible loss .... He may have made a hard and
unconscionable bargain with the defendant, but it is evident that
both parties dealt with each other at arm's length, and whatever
else may be said about the transaction, the usury statute has no
application whatever to it. It was a joint venture or partnership
between two persons to deal in property in order to make
profit. 7
B. Sharing of Losses Is Not Necessary
1. LOSS-SHARING NOT REQUIRED
In addition to the early cases6" indicating that sharing of losses was
not a necessary prerequisite to the existence of a joint adventure, some
jurisdictions still indicate a strong liberality in following this viewpoint.6 9
In Smith v. Grenadier70 a subcontractor and installment purchaser of
excavating machinery entered into a verbal rental agreement whereby the
subcontractor was to make the monthly payments on the machinery al-
though the purchaser would retain title to the equipment when all pay-
ments had been made. Any amounts received by the subcontractor in
excess of his expenses in the excavation project were his profits. The
problem before the court was whether there was a jury question on the
issue of joint adventure between the purchaser and the subcontractor in
order to determine whether the purchaser would be liable for the subcon-
tractor's negligence in crushing the child of the plaintiff. The court held
66. 157 N.Y. 657, 52 N.E. 690 (1899). For a similar viewpoint, see Salter v. Havivi,
215 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
67. Orvis v. Curtiss, 157 N.Y. 657, 661-62, 52 N.E. 690, 691 (1899).
68. Reid v. Shaffer, 249 Fed. 553 (6th Cir. 1918); Warwick v. Stockton, 55 N.J. Eq.
61, 36 Ad. 488 (1897).
69. "It is not necessary to the existence of a joint venture that the parties share losses
as well as profits." Usdan v. Rosenblatt, 93 N.Y.S.2d 862, 863 (Sup. Ct. 1949). See note
34 supra.
70. 203 Va. 740, 127 S.E.2d 107 (1962).
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that there was a sufficient issue of fact as to the existence of a joint
venture to justify submitting it to the jury.
By the arrangement, Grenadier [the purchaser] was getting the
equipment paid for, which the jury could find was a profit or
benefit to him derived from the project. Thus we cannot say, as
a matter of law, a joint adventure did not exist."
This statement indicated that a venture could exist as long as the parties
would be benefitted, no consideration of losses being necessary at all.
Other cases have also indicated that, if all other elements are present, a
joint venture may exist even though one party, as between himself and
his co-adventurer, may participate in the profits and be immune from
losses. 71 It would seem that these courts seek to effectuate the venture as
evidenced by the intention of the parties, regardless of the fact that other
courts rigidly require losses to be shared.78
2. AGREEMENT NOT TO SHARE LOSSES
A corollary of the doctrine not requiring the co-adventurers to share
losses is the theory set forth by some courts that the parties may deter-
mine by agreement, that as between themselves the risk of loss is to be
assumed by one or more of the parties exclusively.74 This is in direct
contrast to the view necessitating an agreement to share losses and illus-
trates a liberality in not requiring loss-sharing, combined with a restric-
tive tenor under which the particular loss-bearing ratio agreement is
deemed essential. Since the basis of the undertaking is the venture agree-
ment, these courts reason that it is the logical repository for all loss con-
siderations and, in those jurisdictions that do not regard loss-sharing as
essential, the agreement should articulate the non-requisite viewpoint.
Normally, the venture agreement will state that one or more of the parties
is exempt from all possible loss, or words of similar import, thereby
eliminating liability for possible financial reversals. 7
71. Id. at 745, 127 S.E.2d at 111.
72. For representative language, see Whetstone v. Purdue, 107 Ore. 86, 213 Pac. 1014
(1923).
73. Compare notes 32 and 34 supra. It must be re-emphasized that the gradations and
distinctions between the cases are never clear-cut. An example is the situation in Oklahoma,
where E.D. Bedwell Coal Co. v. State Industrial Comm'n, 11 P.2d 527, 531 (Okla. 1932),
stated that a joint adventure be "held to exist when one of the parties, while entitled to
share in the profits, if any, was not obligated for any loss." Thirty years later, Pfleider
v. Smith, 370 P.2d 17 (Okla. 1962), held that an agreement to share losses must always
be present. Complexities of this sort are nowhere more prevalent than in Florida. See
section IV of this article's text infra.
74. See note 35 supra.
75. There is a noticeable overlapping between the decisions eliminating loss-sharing by
agreement, and the loan cases guaranteeing repayment regardless of loss. See primarily,
Orvis v. Curtiss, 157 N.Y. 657, 52 N.E. 690 (1899); Salter v. Havivi, 215 N.Y.S.2d 913
(Sup. Ct. 1961).
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IV. THE FLORIDA SYNTHESIS-PROBLEMS UNLIMITED
Florida's position epitomizes what may best be termed as "the height
of confusion." The cases make the blanket assertion that a loss-sharing
provision is a necessary prerequisite to the existence of a joint adven-
ture.76 However, upon examination, they reveal blatant contradictions and
inconsistencies that lend credence to the conclusion that the state courts
desire a loss-sharing requirement, but are unable to formulate a consistent
and logical means of attaining that end. The decisions are interspersed
with instances of express agreements for sharing of losses, implied provi-
sions and some containing no specificity whatsoever. An examination of
the cases not only illustrates the difficulties encountered, but also empha-
sizes the importance of this requirement. Thus, the absence of a showing
of sharing of losses has, more so than that of any other element, caused
the Florida courts to conclude that some type of entity or relationship
was established by the parties other than a joint adventure.
Florida's law of joint ventures is comparatively recent, and, pre-
liminary to viewing the decisions creating the loss-sharing problem, it
would be well to examine early Florida pronouncements.
The first Florida decision recognizing the general legal nature of the
joint adventure was Proctor v. Hearne .7 Its basis was a foreclosure suit
against co-adventurers, and following the two definitions usually proposed
for the relationship, the supreme court took notice of the close affinity
between partnerships and joint ventures, recognizing that the governing
principles were substantially the same.78 The court went on to state:
As respects the character of the business undertaken, the princi-
pal difference between a partnership and a joint adventure is
that the former term is generally used to characterize a general
and continuing joint venture, while the latter term usually,
though not necessarily, designates a single joint venture consist-
ing of one transaction. 9  -
Inherent in this statement was a novel misconception of the nature of the
two relationships. While most courts were still immersed in the belief
that the joint adventure was no more than a specific type of partnership,
the Florida court seemed to say that a partnership was a continuing type
of joint venture. Thus, rather than define the character of the venture
relationship in terms of partnership law, the court did the converse,
making the partnership appear to be a subdivision of the broad category
76. Kislak v. Kreedian, 95 So.2d 510 (Fla. 1957) ; Albert Pack Corp. v. Fickling Prop-
erties, 146 Fla. 362, 200 So. 907 (1941); Bryce v. Bull, 106 Fla. 336, 143 So. 409 (1932)
(by implication); Phillips v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 155 So.2d 415 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1963).
77. 100 Fla. 1180, 131 So. 173 (1930).
78. For some differences that have been propounded, see Jaeger, Joint Ventures, 9 Am.
U.L. REv. 1, 17 (1960); Comment, 18 FoanaAm L. REv. 114, 119-22 (1949).
79. Proctor v. Hearne, 100 Fla. 1180, 1187, 131 So. 173, 176 (1930).
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known as joint adventure. This semantic oversight was corrected by
implication some twenty-seven years later.8 0
One year after the Proctor decision, in Willis v. Fowler,8' the im-
portance of the intention of the parties in determining the nature of the
undertaking and the fiduciary character of the venture relationship were
set forth. The high integrity required of co-adventurers was re-empha-
sized by the Florida Supreme Court twenty-two years after Willis in a
case wherein one joint adventurer fraudulently purchased property with-
out making adequate disclosure of the details of the transaction to his
co-adventurers. 2 In considering his action, the court recognized that joint
adventurers owe to one another the duty of the finest and highest loyalty
as long as the relationship continues. It concluded by reiterating the oft-
cited statement of Judge Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon: 8
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of be-
havior .... Conduct subject to that reproach does not receive
from equity a healing benediction.8"
Of prime importance is the statement in Willis, where the court
mentioned sharing of losses for the first time in its consideration of
whether a transaction was within the rules governing joint adventures,
one of which is the aforementioned fiduciary duties of the parties. After
reiterating the general characteristics of the venture relationship, the
court stated: "The joint adventurers are entitled to share in the profits,
and must also share the losses, if any, which result."85 As substantiation
for this principle, it cited Proctor v. Hearne.86 However, a thorough
perusal of the latter decision reveals no similar statement, either expressly
made or intimated. This remarkable fact can be interpreted in either of
two ways. First, it could be advanced that the court in Willis was con-
clusively establishing the necessity for sharing of losses and merely cited
to Proctor in which the joint adventure concept was initially treated.
However, is it not more logical to view the erroneous reference as evi-
dencing the fact that the ostensible loss-sharing requirement was in
actuality a mere statement of the view of other jurisdictions, and since
this precept was not advanced in Proctor, the Willis case is not deter-
minative on this point? If this is the case, the most-cited Florida decision
80. See Kislak v. Kreedian, 95 So.2d 510 (Fla. 1957).
81. 102 Fla. 35, 136 So. 358 (1931).
82. Donahue v. Davis, 68 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1953).
83. 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
84. Donahue v. Davis, 68 So.2d 163, 171 (Fla..1957).
85. Willis v. Fowler, 102 Fla. 35, 50, 136 So. 358, 365 (1931).
86. 100 Fla. 1180, 131 So. 173 (1930).
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on loss-sharing,87 which was predicated upon the misguided Willis case,
is equally misguided. Carrying this rationale one step further, all subse-
quent cases which based their view of loss-sharing requirements on these
errors could be considered non-persuasive, facilitating a clear opportunity
to re-evaluate Florida's true position. As a practical matter, however, the
Florida Supreme Court has not questioned the matters discussed here
and seems content to utilize the Willis case as precedent for the require-
ment of sharing of losses.
In Bryce v. Bull,"' sharing of losses was mentioned again and the
creative intent of the parties was re-emphasized. The existence of the
joint venture relationship was deemed to be dependent upon the actual
intention of the parties. By utilizing the ordinary rules governing the
interpretation and construction of contracts, the nature of the relation-
ship the parties had intended to exist between themselves could be deter-
mined. The court then proceeded to indicate the troubles that lay ahead
as far as loss-sharing was concerned, by making two extremely confusing
and contradictory statements.
The first was made in considering the fact that the defendants
intended to organize in the future a corporation to buy certain land and,
in so doing, any land-purchase contracts they executed were not to bind
them individually.
If the intent to do those things which constitute a joint adven-
ture exists, the parties will be joint adventurers, notwithstanding
they also intended to avoid personal liability that attaches to
joint adventurers.8"
The court found the existing relationship to be a joint adventure, and
would therefore seem to have said that the results flowing from the inten-
tion of the parties were of sole importance and any facts indicating the
desire to avoid personal obligations would be of no moment.
In the second statement, the court quoted with approval from Ruling
Case Law and stated:
The courts will not countenance ingenious contrivances for
giving persons the whole of the advantages of a partnership,
without subjecting them, as they thought, to any of the lia-
bilities, and an agreement which attempts to carry out a joint
venture for the mutual profit of the adventurers and evade their
responsibility for losses may be enforced and construed as creat-
ing a partnership.90
Does this not seem to say that an agreement 'in which the intent of the
87. Aibert Pack Corp. v. Fickling Properties, 146 Fla. 362, 200 So. 907 (1941).
88. 106 Fla. 336, 143 So. 409 (1932).
89. Id. at 344, 143 So. at 411.
90. Id. at 344, 143 So. at 412.
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parties is to create a joint adventure, but which lacks a loss-sharing provi-
sion, cannot be given a venture interpretation? By the same token, is not
the supreme court of Florida indicating that the establishment of a joint
venture cannot be effectuated absent a provision whereby the parties will
be responsible for losses? The later cases would seem to substantiate an
affirmative reply to these questions. However, we are left with the fact
that the first statement of the court indicates that only intention is de-
terminative, while the latter quotation expresses the primary importance
of responsibility for losses. This inconsistency cannot be explained away;
rather, let it be said that this initial confusion will be given heightened
emphasis in the cases that follow.
A final comment is in order concerning the statement that an agree-
ment which contemplates responsibility for losses being "evaded" may
create a partnership rather than a joint adventure. As has been previously
noted,"' the two relationships are deemed to be quite similar, but from the
practical standpoint of the parties involved, the former causes them to be
equally responsible for losses incurred, while the latter may allow some
of them to avoid liability for losses if a loss provision is not required. In
addition, if the word "evade" is interpreted to mean that the agreement
was silent with respect to sharing of losses, the court indicated that a
joint venture relationship probably would not be created. In the next
Florida decision, however, the supreme court indicated that loss-sharing
may be implied in the absence of an express provision, thus saving the
venture relationship.
Tidewater Constr. Co. v. Monroe County9 2 expressly considered a
loss-sharing problem and delineated certain applicable principles. In that
case, the plaintiff, a corporate paving company, was to oil road surfaces
for another corporation which was constructing roads for the county.
Under their agreement, the plaintiff was to share the profits with the de-
fendant, was not expressly or impliedly responsible for any losses that
might ensue, and had no control over the work done. In addition, there
was no community of interest in the capital used in the business, and the
plaintiff was under no duty to contribute toward the necessary capital to
do the job undertaken by the defendant. Under these circumstances, the
court held the relationship to be that of contractor-subcontractor, thus
allowing the plaintiff to recover on contracting bonds given by the con-
struction company to Monroe County. The court recognized
that joint adventurers are entitled to share in the profits, and
must also share the losses, if any; ... that although there may
not be any express agreement that the parties shall share in the
losses, if any, this must have been implied from the agreement
made, and the circumstances surrounding its execution, as
91. See notes 22 and 78 supra, and accompanying text.
92. 107 Fla. 648, 146 So. 209 (1933).
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having been within the contemplation and intention of the
parties. Of course, where the agreement is in writing and free
from ambiguity or doubt, its legal effect must be determined as
a matter of law, and the intention of the parties gathered there-
from.
3
The loss-sharing superstructure had now begun to take shape in that the
court recognized that, (a) joint adventurers must share losses, and (b)
the basis of such an obligation must either be in the express terms of the
venture agreement or derived by a circumstantially implied provision.
Since the agreement in the instant case was clear on its face and lacked
a loss-sharing provision, none would be implied and any purported
venture was not sustainable.
The case most widely cited to stand for the proposition that "one of
the indispensable factors in proving a co-adventure is the responsibility
of the parties to it for the losses as well as their right to share in the
profits" is Albert Pack Corp. v. Fickling Properties.4 In that case, the
defendant purchased property through the plaintiff corporation for resale,
and any resulting profits were to be divided between the two entities. The
money for the enterprise was furnished by the defendant, and the plaintiff
neither contributed capital or services, nor was found to share in any loss
which might have resulted. The plaintiff corporation sued for an account-
ing respecting the profits resulting from the sale of the subject property,
relying upon a theory of joint adventure. In denying relief, the court held
that participation in losses, one of the essential elements of joint adven-
ture, was absent. In so holding, the categorization of loss-sharing was
expanded beyond Tidewater95 through the following words:
In the contract.., there was no express agreement with refer-
ence to any hazard that the plaintiff took or any loss that it
might suffer in the event that the property should be eventually
sold for less than the amount paid for it. No provision was
adopted from which this risk could be implied and no invest-
ment was made by it from which loss [actually] could be
suffered .... 96
Thus, loss-sharing could have been satisfied by an express provision, by
the presence of a provision from which risk of loss could be implied or,
actions of the parties making them susceptible to loss, irrespective of the
venture agreement. The court obviously inferred that had the plaintiff
actually risked the loss of invested capital, his duty to share in losses
would have been deemed satisfied and the assertion of joint adventure
sustained. Standing alone, this addition of a third means of fulfilling ele-
93. Id. at 653, 146 So. at 211. (Emphasis added.)
94. 146 Fla. 362, 365, 200 So. 907, 908 (1941).
95. Supra note 92.
96. Supra note 94 at 365, 200 So. at 908. (Emphasis added.)
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mental requirements does no more than accentuate the evolving com-
plexity of loss-sharing. However, the new "acts of the parties" category
is quite disturbing when we consider statements by Florida's legal en-
cyclopedias concerning sharing of losses.
Florida Jurisprudence states:
Parties to an agreement are not coadventurers where the agree-
ment has no provision, either express or implied, for the sharing
of losses. 7 A contract that lacks a provision, either express or
implied, for sharing possible losses does not form the basis for
the relation of joint adventure, even though profits are to be
divided. 8
Florida Law and Practice makes a similar pronouncement:
An essential element in order to establish the relationship of the
parties as that of joint adventurers is that it is necessary that
there be an agreement to share jointly on some agreed basis not
only the profits but also the losses .... Where the agreement is
silent with respect to the division of the profits and losses or is
uncertain in its terms, the court has repeatedly refused to char-
acterize the arrangement as that of joint adventure.9
Both these treatises place the rule within the confines of the agreement
creating the purported joint adventure. Their sole reference to a loss-
sharing provision, express or implied, as an essential element of the
venture relationship, accentuates by omission the fact that there is a total
lack of recognition of an "acts of the parties" situation. This point is
further emphasized by the fact that Florida Jurisprudence cites Albert
Pack'00 as substantiating authority for the statement limiting the loss-
sharing requirement to an express or implied provision. As we have seen,
this was not the case. The only reasonable explanation this writer can
advance for this seemingly obvious inconsistency is the fact that perhaps,
rather than recognizing a separate subdivision of loss-sharing, the "im-
plied provision" area was simply broadened to encompass both the facets
of the venture agreement and the external circumstances surrounding its
execution. Though logical enough, this approach was not pursued by the
court in subsequent decisions. It could have adopted a definite categoriza-
tion of loss-sharing and greatly lessened the confusion surrounding the
venture concept, but failed to do so.
Uhrig v. Redding'0 involved a partner's suit for an accounting. Pur-
suant to a verbal agreement, the defendant supplied all the capital for
breeding and raising livestock and the plaintiff furnished his time, effort
97. 18 FLA. JUR. Joint Adventures § 8 at 438, 439 (1958).
98. Id. at 484 n.13.
99. 14 FLA. LAW & PRAcTIcE Joint Adventures § 7 at 140 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
100. Supra note 94.
101. 150 Fla. 480, 8 So.2d 4 (1942).
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and skill in managing the business. The agreement provided that each
party should have a one-half interest in all the assets of the business and
profits realized were to be shared equally. Totally lacking, however, was
any mention of loss-sharing. Nevertheless, the court held a "partnership"
existed, based primarily upon the intention of the parties and the follow-
ing interpretation of sharing of losses:
Appellant [plaintiff] supplied the labor, experience and skill,
appellee the necessary capital. Any profit was to be shared
equally. Losses would also be shared, for in the event of loss,
appellant would have exercised his skill and effort in vain, and
appellee would have to suffer diminishment of his capital invest-
ment.' os
There could certainly be no doubt now that a new category of loss-sharing
had indeed been suggested by Albert Pack, and clearly adopted in Uhrig.
By the very nature of the relationship between the parties supplying
capital and services, losses would be deemed shared even without any
specific reference to this factor in the parties' agreement. In addition, the
term "loss" was interpreted for the first time, and was made to extend
beyond mere monetary loss, encompassing the diminishment of whatever
had been contributed by the respective parties. 0 3 It would appear then,
at this juncture, that the outline of loss-sharing consisted of three cate-
gorical divisions:
A Express agreement to share losses
B Implied loss-sharing provision
C Loss-sharing irrespective of the venture agreement
(1) Acts of the parties from which loss could actually be sus-
tained-Albert Pack
(2) Nature of the relationship determined by the contribution of
the parties-Ukrig
The pressing question was-Would the Florida Supreme Court finally
treat subsequent decisions in a manner consistent with their loss-sharing
pronouncements uttered thus far? Confusingly enough, the next case
provided a negative answer, while the decision immediately following
it was disposed of in a manner thoroughly consistent with U/rig.
The factual situation in Beckett v. Pierce' was quite complex.
The plaintiff investigated the investment possibilities of a purchase of
the stock of Piggly-Wiggly Corporation, and planned to negotiate the
transaction and eventually manage the successor corporation. The de-
fendants were to help finance the project, with the plaintiff's contribution
being limited to his knowledge and services. Subsequently, following a
102. Id. at 484, 8 So.2d at 6.
103. For similar cases, see note 33 supra.
104. 157 Fla. 184, 25 So.2d 486 (1946).
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rejection of an original offer to purchase formulated by the plaintiff, the
defendants secretely purchased the stock and the plaintiff sought to hold
them as constructive trustees due to an alleged violation of their fiduciary
obligations as joint adventurers. However, it appeared that there was no
actual agreement between the parties, written or otherwise, and the de-
fendants had actually offered the plaintiff his share of the stock at their
cost. It was obvious that no venture was present in the absence of an
agreement to enter into such a relationship, and the plaintiff was in no
way damaged by the acts of the defendants. The disconcerting feature of
this case, however, was the court's statement that, "we do not glean...
an agreement for joint adventure, not to mention the manner of distri-
bution of losses were the enterprise to fail, another indispensable
factor. o10 5
One would have thought that, following Uhrig, a factual pattern
in which one party furnished the capital for the enterprise and the other
his knowledge and skills, would have arbitrarily satisfied the sharing of
losses requirements to which the Florida courts have so steadfastly
adhered. This was not the case, however, since the court in Beckett indi-
cated that not only was an agreement for joint adventure lacking, but
in addition, losses were not shared. It would certainly have been more
reasonable to decide against the plaintiff on the former ground and to
hold that the second element was satisfied due to the reasoning in Uhrig.
Rather than diminishing, it seemed that the confused contradictions and
inconsistencies were being compounded and increased with alarming
frequency.
In Russell v. Thielen,106 the Uhrig case was almost identically
tracked. It involved a suit for an accounting by real estate developers
against owners of a subdivision based upon an alleged joint adventure
in the development and sale of the subdivided lots. The only agreement
between the parties was an oral one, and the court recognized that it
was not sufficient, standing alone, to indicate a joint adventure. How-
ever, the holding was still joint venture, rather than exclusive sales
agency, based upon the manifested intent of the parties and a view of
all the relevant facts which included one party supplying the necessary
funds and the others furnishing the labor, experience and skill. The
court stated:
Losses under such circumstances would be shared, for in the
event of a loss the party supplying the "know how" would
have exercised his skill in vain and the party supplying the
capital investment would have suffered diminishment. 10 7
It becomes evident that the mere contributions of the parties, in those
105. Id. at 191i 25 So.2d at 489.
106. 82 So.2d 143 (Fla. 1955).
107. Id. at 146.
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limited factual patterns in which this interpretation is applicable,
furnishes automatic satisfaction of loss-sharing requirements and obviates
any difficulties they might have engendered. Is this really the case how-
ever? The wording of the court is perfectly explicit in stating that losses
would be shared. However, a recent Florida case, next to be examined,
adds what may be termed the last straw of utter confusion to this al-
ready muddled picture.
Phillips v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.10 is a most perplexing
decision. The defendant issued an employee's fidelity bond, insuring
against employee dishonesty up to 10,000 dollars. In consideration of
the premium paid, the insurer was obligated to indemnify the plaintiff
for all losses sustained during the insurance period, except that the
insuring agreements did not apply to "loss, damage or destruction caused
or contributed to by any fraudulent, dishonest or criminal act committed
by a partner of the assured .. ."' The term employee was defined in
the insurance agreement as one compensated by salary and directed by
the assured. Subsequently, the plaintiff entered into an agreement with
B, whereby the plaintiff would furnish the capital necessary to the
business of transportation brokerage, and B's contribution was to be
the management and operation of the enterprise. In addition, the parties
were to divide the net profits, B was to draw a weekly salary, was referred
to as an employee, and had employee withholding taxes paid for him
by the plaintiff. There was no mention of sharing of losses. Some time
later, B wrongfully converted checks payable to him for the business,
and the plaintiff filed suit charging that B was an employee and, due
to his acts, the plaintiff should recover under the terms of the fidelity
bond. The defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the agreement
between the plaintiff and B was not covered by the terms of the policy.
The trial court ruled for the defendant, even though the plaintiff had
alleged that B had no responsibility to share the losses of the business,
and was therefore not a partner or co-adventurer of the plaintiff. The
appellate court reversed the lower tribunal, holding that the absence
of a provision under which the parties clearly intended that B should
share in the losses of the enterprise was fatal to the defendant's con-
tentions.
If the court had merely determined that there was no joint ad-
venture due to the strong indication of a contrary intent by the repeated
references to "employee" in the agreement between the plaintiff and B,
the conclusion would be completely justifiable. However, the reason that
the decision is so troubling and one that contravenes the principles over-
whelmingly established by the Uhrig and Russell cases, is the fact that
its basis was the lack of a loss-sharing provision. Had it not been es-
108. 155 So.2d 415 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
109. Id. at 416.
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tablished by the Florida Supreme Court that sharing of losses require-
ments could be satisfied irrespective of the actual venture agreement?
Indeed, the defendant was of the same opinion as this writer, since it
based its case upon the fact that sharing of losses was included in the
undertaking between the plaintiff and B due to the Uhrig case, and
cited in its behalf the same passage previously alluded to."' However,
this court rejected the defendant's contentions by distinguishing the
instant case, in that here, "there was no contemplation in the agreement
for ... [B] to share losses. '
Could not the same be said of Uhrig and Russell? In both of those
cases, the agreement between the parties, as here, was totally devoid
of any reference to loss-sharing and not susceptible to any such in-
ference. The loss requirement was met outside the agreement, indeed,
without considering it. By the very fact that the contributions of the
parties were funds on the one hand, and services on the other, losses
were unequivocally deemed to have been shared. In the instant case,
did not the plaintiff furnish the necessary capital and B his services?
Is not this case a tacit overruling of both Uhrig and Russell, as far as
the loss-sharing issue is concerned?
If there was any doubt about the answer to the latter question, one
only had to read a little -further in the Phillips opinion to see that the
whole concept of the loss issue was changed:
"Share of losses" means to be responsible or liable for the
losses created by the venture and liability, if any, to creditors
or third parties." 2
These words connote monetary loss, a term expressly deemed to be not
completely necessary in both the Uhrig and Russell cases. In other words,
by the instant case, the Second District had interpreted the law of
Florida, respecting sharing of losses, to mean only those losses provided
for either expressly or impliedly within the four corners of the venture
agreement, thus ignoring all the decisions rendered after the Albert Pack
case. Phillips can be interpreted in no way other than a direct abrogation
of reasoning previously set forth by our highest court. However, no
mention of conflict is made. Perhaps the only consolation is that all
decisions examined in this article, other than Phillips, were rendered
by the Florida Supreme Court and thus overruling of the latter is still
possible.
V. OVERVIEW
The condition of Florida law, concerning the sharing of losses, is
indeed a remarkable conglomeration of inconsistencies and judicial
110. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
111. Phillips v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 155 So.2d 415, 419 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
112. Ibid.
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question marks. Indeed, the Florida cases not only typify the nationwide
confusion engendered by the loss-sharing concept, but magnify it to a
considerable extent. Perhaps the only assertion that may be made without
fear of contradiction is that Florida appears to require loss-sharing as a
necessary prerequisite to the existence of the joint adventure relation-
ship. How it is to be recognized and in what manner it must be presented
and satisfied are more difficult questions which have not, as yet, been
satisfactorily answered.
VI. CONCLUSION
The sharing of losses problem permeates joint adventures and due
to the "judicial vacillation in the interchangeable application of the joint
venture and partnership concepts"11 and the similarity of applicable legal
principles between the two relationships, it may be termed a source of
mutual vexation. However, the general acceptance of this unitary identity
of partnership as joint venture, and vice-versa, may obscure the im-
portance and usefulness of the latter relationship as a separate concept
and, by the same token, may becloud a vital element upon which its
existence depends-that of loss-sharing. Whether a particular jurisdiction
adopts an affirmative or negative viewpoint with respect to the indis-
pensability of loss-sharing will both determine the character of the under-
taking before the court and the fortunes of the litigants responsible for
its formation. As already pointed out,1 14 an individual may furnish the
money for an enterprise, relying upon assertions by the other parties to
the effect that he will be handsomely repaid, regardless of any loss. If
there are financial reversals and litigation for the return of his funds
ensues, his fortunes rest solely upon, all other factors being equal, whether
the forum state requires sharing of losses. If so, the transaction most
probably will be labeled a usurious loan and the monies advanced will be
forfeited. Similar examples may be readily furnished by resort to the read-
er's imagination. What then, can and should be done to aid the courts in
reaching logical and judicially consistent results on the issue of sharing
of losses?
It could be submitted that since the basis of the relationship is
contractual, prime consideration should be given the intent of the parties
in entering into the transaction in question. No rigid set of required
elements will ever do justice to the myriad of factual circumstances
encounterable. Similarly, an ad hoc determination in each case based
upon a court's interpretation of intent will produce even more confusion
than that which exists at the present time.
The only other alternative appears to be a conscious effort on the
part of the bench toward recognizing the contours of loss-sharing and
113. 18 FoRDn A L. REv. 114, 119 (1949).
114. See notes 62-67 supra and accompanying text.
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the categorical divisions established by judicial edict. Thus, some sem-
blance of order could be fashioned out of this maze of contradictions
and inconsistencies, fostering a realistic approach to a current legal prob-
lem area.
MARTIN E. SEGAL
